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The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Ohio's Drug
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants often learn that much of their fate in court proceedings turns on
whether a statute used in their prosecution is civil or criminal. Generally, the
rights and protections afforded a criminal defendant are greater than those
afforded a civil defendant. The differences between civil and criminal
proceedings extend from constitutional guarantees to varying degrees of burden
of proof required at trial. 1 The primary distinction between civil and criminal
statutes is that criminal statutes are punitive in nature whereas civil statutes are
remedial in nature.2 In this regard, forfeiture statutes present a particularly
difficult problem in determining whether a statute is civil or criminal.
Generally speaking, forfeiture statutes are considered to be in rem. 3 Arguably,
in rem proceedings are aimed "at the property," and as such should be
considered remedial or civil in nature. However, by targeting a defendant's
property and thereby stripping him of ownership, the overriding result of a
forfeiture proceeding might also be considered punitive, and thereby criminally
natured. The question is not easy, as evidenced by the evolution of legal theory
concerning civil and criminal sanctions.
As with many areas of the law, views concerning civil and criminal law
have varied and changed throughout history. Civil and criminal laws were once
considered to occupy opposite ends of the spectrum in the legal arena. This
early view is evidenced by the words of Lord Mansfield when in 1776 he
stated that "there is no distinction better known, than the distinction between
civil and criminal laws or between criminal prosecutions and civil actions." 4
As time progresses, however, so does the law. As such, time has allowed the
civil-criminal distinction to draw closer as it has overlapped, entangled, and
merged, particularly in forfeiture law; sometimes creating confusion in
determining whether a proceeding is criminal or civil in nature.
1 See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
2 State v. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d 916, 923 (Ohio 1991) (Resnick, J., dissenting)
(citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984)).
3 Black's Law Dictionary defines "in rem" as "a technical term used to designate
proceedings or actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions,
which are said to be inpersonam." BLACK'S LAw DicrnoNARY 793 (6th ed. 1990).
4 Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142, 1147 (K.B. 1775).
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Although civil sanctions may be used as alternatives to criminal
prosecutions,5 they need not be limited as such. As one commentator noted,
there is an important distinction between civil sanction laws that are meant as
alternatives to criminal proceedings, and those intended to "supplement the
risks and punishments of criminal proceedings." 6 The latter type displays a
middle ground between civil and criminal proceedings that is often exemplified
by drug forfeiture laws. The use of forfeiture laws in seizing the tools of a drug
dealer's business is not intended to impede or deter the criminal prosecution of
defendants, but rather is intended to aid in the common goal of fighting the war
on drugs.
As this Note will argue, it is important to determine whether a statute is
civil or criminal. Many potential rights of a would-be criminal defendant hang
in the balance of the determination. 7 Although at first blush a statute might
appear to be civil in nature, a closer look may prove otherwise. Whether a
statute is civil or criminal in nature has become increasingly important for
property owners in the past few years as the federal government has escalated
the use of its drug forfeiture laws.8 As a result of this increased use in drug
cases, defendants are learning firsthand about the implications of their rights in
criminal and civil proceedings. 9
Ohio recently dealt with the issue of whether its drug forfeiture statute is
criminal or civil in State v. Casalicchio.10 In Casalicchio, the Ohio Supreme
Court veered away from the rule of many states" to hold that forfeiture of
5 Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Lin ts on Using Gvil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-avil Distinction, 42
-AsTINGS L.J. 1325, 1333 (1991).6 Fran;lin E. Zimring, The Muliple Middlegrounds Between Cvil and Criminal Lav,
101 YALE L.. 1901, 1904 (1992).
7 The determination affects the defendant from the beginning of a case to its very end.
For example, a criminal defendant must be given Miranda warnings during arrest, which is
often long before trial. On the other end of the scale, the burden of proof for criminal trials
is usually higher than for civil trials. For a more detailed discussion, see supra notes 48-63
and accompanying text.
8 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 &
Supp. 1 1989)).
9 See, e.g., Dennis Cauchon, Are Seizures Legalized Theft? Government Doesn't Have
to Prove Guilt, USA TODAY, May 18, 1992, at Al; see also Gary Fields, 'Robbery With a
Badge' in the Nation's Capital, USA TODAY, May 18, 1992, at A6.
10 569 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 1991).
11 States interpreting their own drug forfeiture laws as being civil in nature include
California, Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. See infra note 34.
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property pursuant to Ohio's drug forfeiture laws 12 constitutes a criminal rather
than civi! proceeding. 13
This Note seeks to explore and discuss the tests set forth in Casalicchio for
making such a determination, illustrating the arguments and effects employed
in the different tests. In doing so, Part II of the Note looks at the history of
forfeiture law. Part M discusses constitutional and other implications of
determining whether a statute is civil or criminal. Part IV looks briefly at
Casalicchio and the tests employed therein. Part V then discusses the possible
tests one might apply in making the civil-criminal determination. Part VI
applies the tests adopted by both the majority and dissent in Casalicchio to the
Ohio drug forfeiture statute. Finally, Part VII argues that neither test adopted in
Casalicchio is appropriate and offers an alternative test to use in making the
determination of whether a statute is civil or criminal.
I. HISTORY
A. Early Forns of Fofeiture
Early forms of forfeiture can be traced back as far as the Old Testament
and the Ancient Greeks. 14 These people forfeited as deodand15 to the Crown
items that caused the injury or death of another regardless of any fault or
wrongdoing by the owner.' 6 Common law in England had a similar rule,
requiring any chattel causing one's death to be forfeited to the King.' 7 Early
views justified this result through religious beliefs. Specifically, "the
12 oo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.41-43 (Anderson 1993).
13 Justice Resnick, in dissent, disagreed with the majority that Ohio Revised Code
Section 2933.43 entails a criminal sanction. Applying a different test than the majority,
Justice Resnick determined the statute to be civil in nature. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d at 922-
26.
14 Walter J. Van Eck, The New Oregon Civil Forfeiture Law, 26 WILLAmErE L.
REV. 449, 451 n.15 (1990) (quoting Exodus 21:28, "If an ox gore a man or a woman, that
they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner
of the ox shall be quit" and _sehines the Greek (389-314 B.C.), "we banish beyond our
boarders sticks and stones... if they chance to kill a man .... .") (citation omitted).
For a recent discussion of early forms of forfeiture, see Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801 (1993).
15 "Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dondwn, 'to be given to God.'" Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974).
16 Michael Schecter, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1151, 1153 (1990).
17 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681.
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instrument of death was accused," and, as such, required religious expiation.' 8
Later views, however, justified the result by arguing that forfeiture was a
penalty for carelessness. 19
Another form of forfeiture arose at common law in England for convictions
of felonies and treason. 20 This forfeiture was considered criminal and was
rationalized by the belief that such acts were breaches of the King's peace, a
proper penalty being the loss of one's personal property. 21
B. History of Modem Forfeiture Law
There are multiple theories concerning the beginnings of modem forfeiture
laws. Oliver W. Holmes argued in The Common Law that these laws derive
from the deodand of common law.22 Holmes concluded that deodand liability
was assigned to an object causing death or injury because of the object's
"motion."23 He analogized this motion to that of ships moving through water
to conclude that admiralty forfeiture derived from deodand. 24 Some courts have
readily adopted this theory25 while others have not.
Another theory of the development of modem forfeiture law rejects
Holmes's notion and argues that modem forfeiture law originated
independently of deodands during England's maritime expansion.26 This theory
explains that admiralty wanted to expand its jurisdiction to gain more clients. In
order to do so, the admiralty courts had to "curry the business of the merchant
181d.
19 1d.
20 Id. at 682.
21 Id. (citing 1 WLLLAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *229).
22 Schecter, supra note 16, at 1153 (citing to OLIvER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 25-30 (1923)). For a discussion of the common law see supra notes 14-21 and
accompanying text.
231d
24 In Holmes's words, "The most striking example... is a ship. IThe old books say
that, if a man falls from a ship and is drowned, the motion of the ship must be taken to
cause the death, and the ship is forfeited ... ." OLVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAw 26 (1923) (emphasis added).
25 See Schecter, supra note 16, at 1153 n.18.
26 ld. at 1154. The author points out that forfeitures and deodands share certain
characteristics including their both being (1) the exclusive prerogative of the state, (2) in
rem actions, and (3) imposed regardless of the owner's state of mind. Id. at 1153 n.20
(citing Jacob Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169,
251 (1973)).
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class," which favored the in rem proceeding. 27 The result was that admiralty
laws developed in rem proceedings in which one could lose his ship for failing
to pay customs duties. 28 Although the Continental Congress complained of
Great Britain's use of such laws, the United States found itself implementing
similar rules in the first session of Congress. 29 Thus, this theory argues that
modem forfeiture laws are descendants of early customs laws.30
C. Drug Forfeiture Laws
Considering the size of the drug problem in the United States, it is hard to
believe the federal government did not enact its drug forfeiture act until 1970
when Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act.3 1 As
amended, this statute helps the government lead the war on drugs in America.
It generally provides law enforcement officials the power of forfeiture over
monies, manufacturing materials, transportation vehicles, and property
involved with the illegal use of controlled substances. 32 Interpretation of the
statute was broadened in 1988 when the federal executive branch implemented
its "zero tolerance" policy aimed not only at stopping the supply of drugs, but
also at halting the demand for them.33 Following the lead of the federal
government, many states, Ohio included, began enacting their own drug
forfeiture laws.34 The Ohio statute, codified at Ohio Revised Code Sections
2933.42 and 2933.43,35 was recently interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court in
State v. Casalicchio.36
27 Id. at 1154.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1154-55.
30 Id. at 1155.
31 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 &
Supp. 11989)).
32 Id.
33 Schecter, supra note 16, at 1152.
34 Van Eck, supra note 14, at 457 n.55 (citing California, Idaho, Nevada, and
Washington as states with drug forfeiture laws and discussing the Oregon drug forfeiture
laws); see also T.J. I-tes, Ovil Forfeiture of Property for Drug Offenders Under ilinois and
Federal Statute: Zero Tolerance, Zero Exceptions, 25 J. MARSHALL L. Rv. 389 (1992)
(discussing the Illinois drug forfeiture law).
35 OMO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.42, 2933.43 (Anderson 1993).
36 569 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 1991).
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III. STATE V. CASALICCHIO
On August 25, 1987, Joseph Casalicchio was driving at a high rate of
speed near Cleveland, Ohio, where he was stopped by a police officer who
conducted a routine inventory search of Casalicchio's car.37 The search
revealed that Casalicchio was in possession of drugs and related drug
paraphernalia in violation of Ohio law.38 These items included marijuana
cigarettes, hashish, cocaine, and a cocaine inhaler.39 Casalicchio pleaded no
contest to two felony offenses and was sentenced for these crimes. 4°
The problem at hand-determining the nature of drug forfeiture statutes-
began three days after Casalicchio's sentencing when the State petitioned for
forfeiture of the 1974 Chevrolet that Casalicchio was driving when he was
arrested on August 25th. A hearing for the petition was held and an order of
forfeiture was handed down in early April of 1988.41 Casalicchio appealed the
forfeiture order and the court of appeals reversed the trial court.42 The case
was ultimately decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, which held that the motor
vehicle was contraband as determined by statute and as such was subject to
forfeiture pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2933.43(C).43 The court,
however, explained in some detail that while it believed the automobile was
subject to forfeiture, that forfeiture of Casalicchio's automobile "pursuant to
[Ohio Revised Code Section] 2933.43 constitutes a separate criminal penalty in
addition to the penalty [he faced] for conviction of the underlying felony."44 As
such, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the Ohio and United States
Constitutions barred "the state from seeking a new penalty to a crime after a
defendant has been sentenced for that crime." 45 Although agreeing on other
3 7 State v. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d 916, 917 (Ohio 1991).
38 Id.
3 9 Id.
4 0 Id. (quoting from the record, "Casalicchio pleaded no contest to possession of a
controlled substance, cocaine, in violation of [Ohio Revised Code Section] 2925.11 and
possession of a criminal tool, the inhaler, in violation of [Ohio Revised Code Section]
2933.24.-).
41 Id.
4 2 Id.
43 Id. at 918. The statute provides in pertinent part: "Upon the seizure of contraband
pursuant to division (A) of this section, the prosecution attorney.., shall file a petition for
the forfeiture, to the seizing law enforcement agency, of the seized contraband." i at 925
(citing OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2933.43(C)). Section 2933.43(C) of the Ohio Revised
Code has subsequently been amended, although not substantively.
44 Casalicdhio, 569 N.E.2d at 921 (emphasis added).
45 Id.
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grounds as to the ultimate result of the case,46 Justice Resnick filed an
aggressive dissent to the majority's finding that Ohio Revised Code Section
2933.43 constituted a criminal action. Rather, Justice Resnick argued that the
statute involves a civil action. 47
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF A CIVIL-CRIMINAL DETERMINATION
As previously noted, whether a sanction is civil or criminal can
significantly affect a defendant's rights, beginning from the outset of a case and
carrying through its end.48 The Casalicchio case brings to light some of the
ramifications of the civil-criminal distinction. In determining that the Ohio drug
forfeiture provision involves a criminal sanction, the Casalicchio court
effectively precluded the government from seizing Casalicchio's car. 49
Generally, the government may seek civil forfeiture before, during, or after a
criminal prosecution, but the same is not true of criminal forfeitures. In
Casalicchio, the government sought to enforce a criminal forfeiture action after
a separate criminal prosecution for the same crime had already taken place.50
As such, the court's finding that the Ohio drug forfeiture law was criminal
caused the prosecutors to violate the Double Jeopardy provisions of both the
United States and Ohio Constitutions.51 This is but one consequence of the
civil-criminal distinction.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution is also
implicated. If a court finds a statute to be criminal, the defendant will enjoy
heightened Eighth Amendment rights that prohibit "cruel and unusual
punishment" and "excessive fines." 52 Although this amendment does not by its
46 The ultimate result of the case was that Casalicchio's car could not be forfeited. Id.
at 922.
47 Id. at 922-25. The majority-dissent disagreement originates in the use of two
different tests to determine the nature of the Ohio statute. The majority relied on a test that
is less deferential to legislative intent than the test relied on by Justice Resnick's dissent. Id.
at 920-21, 923-24; see supra note 13; see also infra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
48 See supra note 7.
49 Casal'cchio, 569 N.E.2d at 916-21. Some commentators believe that, although it is
important to distinguish between civil and criminal cases, consequences of the distinction
are limited. Cheh, supra note 5, at 1369. Cheh argues that in certain areas of civil and
criminal cases, constitutional rights traditionally afforded a criminal defendant have begun
to or should be applied in civil proceedings as well. Id. at 1369-89.
50 Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d at 917.
51 Id. at 921. The amendments protect a defendant from bearing multiple criminal
penalties for the same crime. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; Omo CONST. art. I, § 10.
52 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
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terms limit itself to criminal cases, the United States Supreme Court has
predominately applied it as such. 53
The privilege against self-incrimination provided for in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution is also affected by the
Casalicchio court's determination. 54 The terms of the Fifth Amendment appear
to limit its protection to criminal cases. 55 However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the amendment to allow its use in proceedings if a witness's
testimony "will lead to or provide evidence that could be used in a subsequent
criminal case."56 This has important effects as its use in a civil proceeding is
limited to those cases in which the evidence actually tends to incriminate the
witness. On the other hand, there is no question that the Fifth Amendment's
protection is afforded a criminal defendant. Moreover, the party invoking the
privilege in a civil suit may later be barred from using the omitted evidence on
his own behalf.57
Still another constitutional privilege affected by the civil-criminal
determination is a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in
criminal proceedings. 58 The Supreme Court has refused to extend this privilege
beyond a criminal context.59 If a defendant in a civil forfeiture case is to be
53 Cheh, supra note 5, at 1381. At the time, Cheh noted that the Supreme Court had
hinted to the possibility of its applying the Excessive Fines Clause to civil proceedings. Id.
(citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)). Hindsight has
proven Cheh's notion correct as the Court recently determined that application of the
Excessive Fines Clause is not limited to criminal cases. See Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801 (1993) (refusing, however, to determine whether the Clause in fact was violated in
that case and refusing to explain circumstances under which the Clause might generally be
violated in civil proceedings).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242 (1980), held this privilege did not apply to civil forfeiture. Cheh, supra note 5, at 1386.
55 The Fifth Amendment states that "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see also Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993) (discussing the Fifth Amendment in conjunction with
statement that "[s]ome provisions of the Bill of Rights are expressly limited to criminal
cases").
56 Cheh, supra note 5, at 1384-85 (citing Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,
805 (1977)).
57 Id at 1385 (citing SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5 9 Jay A. Rosenburg, Constitutional Rights and CYvi Forfeiture Actions, 88 CoLUM. L.
REV. 390, 401 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)); see also Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993) (discussing the Sixth Amendment in conjunction with
statement that "[s]ome provisions of the Bill of Rights are expressly limited to criminal
cases").
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accorded such a right, that right will need to be channeled to him via due
process grounds.60 However, there is a presumption against using the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in a civil context, and overcoming this
presumption is no easy task.61 A criminal defendant need not have this concern
as his right to counsel is guaranteed by the amendment.
The privileges just mentioned are only a few of those affected by the
Casalicchio court's determination that forfeiture of property pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code Section 2933.43 entails a criminal sanction. Other privileges
include the Fourth Amendment's concern for privacy and arbitrary intrusions,
the appropriate burdens of proof, and rights afforded by grand jury
indictment. 62 Moreover, state constitutional issues are also affected. 63
Considering the many ramifications caused by the civil-criminal distinction, it
is clear that the Casalicchio decision is critical to a defendant's rights under the
Ohio drug forfeiture provision. As a result, determining a proper test to apply
in maling the distinction should be closely scrutinized.
V. POSSIBLE TmS TO APPLY iN THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DETERMINATION
The evolution of decisions in this area has brought a basic format to the
process of determining whether a statute is civil or criminal. Two primary tests
are employed, each using the same basic format on a two-step basis. Step one
involves determining Congressional intent to enact a civil or criminal statute.
Step two entails possibly overriding the intent articulated by the legislature.
A. Test One. Kennedy v. Mendozo-Martinez
As early as 1886, in Boyd v. United States,64 the United States Supreme
Court stated that Congress may not, by the mere labeling of a statute as civil,
preclude a court from determining the true nature of the proceeding. 65 This
being true, the Court later made a ruling seemingly inconsistent with Boyd in
Helvering v. Mitchell66 in which it argued that the determination of whether a
60 See Rosenburg, supra note 59, at 401.
61 Id. at 401-02, 403-06 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
25-27 (1981)).62 See Cheh, supra note 5, at 1349, 1369.
63 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio Constitution affords one example. OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 10; see State v. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Ohio 1991).
64 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
65 ld. at 633-35. The Court found that although the government sought to impose civil
forfeitures, the proceeding was essentially criminal for constitutional protections. Id.
66 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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statute is civil or criminal rests upon Congress' intent to create a civil or
criminal penalty. 67 As one commentator noted, Helvering showed an immense
amount of deference by the Court to Congress. Unfortunately for Congress,
however, it never fully examined the bounds of Helvering before the test was
altered. 68
Kennedy v. Mendozo-Martinez,69 which the majority in State v.
Casalicchio relies on, added a second step to the process. 70 The unchanged
first step still required a determination of whether Congress intended to enact a
civil or criminal statute.71 The additional second step is.applied only if the first
step brings the court to the determination that the legislature intended to enact a
civil statute. Assuming such an intention is found, a court should then consider
seven nonexhaustive factors in determining whether the Constitution requires
the statute to be considered criminal, thereby overriding Congressional intent.72
These factors include:
[F]irst, whether the statute creates an affirmative disability or restraint; second,
whether the underlying behavior has been historically punished as a crime;
third, whether the statute requires scienter; fourth, whether the statute
promotes retribution and/or deterrence; fifth, whether the underlying behavior
is currently a crime; sixth, whether there is an alternative, non-penal purpose
behind the law; and seventh, whether the law is well-tailored to its non-penal
purpose. 7
3
The Kennedy court, however, never substantively reached the seven point
layout as it determined that Congress intended the statute then under
interpretation to be criminal.74
B. Test Two: United States v. Ward
The United States Supreme Court was given an opportunity to apply the
Kennedy test seventeen years after that decision in United States v. Ward,75 but
67 See id at 398-405.
6 8 Schecter, supra note 16, at 1157-58.
69 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
7 0 See id. at 168-69.
71 Id. at 169. As Justice Resnick noted in her dissent, the Casalicchio majority brushed
this question aside. State v. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d 916, 923 (Ohio 1991) (Resnick, J.,
dissenting).
72 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
73 Schecter, supra note 16, at 1158 (citing Kennedy).
7 4 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169. The Court did, however, say that it was "convinced"
that application of the Kennedy criteria to the statute revealed it to be criminal. Id.
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opted instead to alter the process for making the civil-criminal determination. 76
The court retained the first step dealing with congressional intent. However,
rather than delve into the seven factors set forth in Kennedy, the Ward Court
stated that the second tier of the process was to inquire "further whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the]
intention [that the statute be civil]." 77 If indeed the statutory scheme proves to
be "so punitive," it will be considered a criminal statute despite the apparent
congressional intent that it be civil. The Court stated that "only the clearest
proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a
ground." 78
It is important to realize the distinction between the Kennedy and Ward
decisions. The Ward test is much more deferential to Congress, requiring the
"clearest proof" that the statute is "so punitive" as to negate its congressional
intent. The Kennedy test, on the other hand, weighs seven factors to make the
determination. 79 Kennedy uses objective standards to determine the issue
without giving an overwhelming amount of deference to Congress. Although
the Ward decision was handed down after Kennedy, it apparently has not
displaced the Kennedy test, as evidenced by subsequent cases involving one test
or the other.80 The distinction between the two tests is the starting point for the
75 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Justice Resnick relies on Ward in her dissent in Casalicchio.
Casaicchio, 569 N.E.2d at 923-24.
76 Schecter, supra note 16, at 1158.
77 Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49. The Court does mention that the Kennedy factor-
analysis had been used by the Court of Appeals in the Ward case and also that it had been
helpful in the past. However, the Court does not rely on the seven points as though they
constitute the second tier of a test. Only one point of the seven is mentioned. See id, at 248-
50.
78 Id. at 249 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
79 Schecter, supra note 16, at 1158-59.
80 Id. at 1159 n.60 and accompanying text. The footnote states in pertinent part:
[The] ... lack of preference for either test can be seen in the failure of Ward to
recognize that the new test might yield different results than the... [Kennedy] test. The
Court indicated that it was merely restating the... [Kennedy] factors, implying that the
Ward test is the same as the older test.
Id.
The Supreme Court has recently affirmed this notion. Explaining the Government's
misplaced reliance on Kennedy and Ward in a recent Eighth Amendment case, the Court
stated,
The question in [Kennedy and WardJ was whether a nominally civil penalty should be
reclassified as criminal and the safeguards that attend a criminal prosecution should be
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discrepancy between the majority and dissent in Casalicchio. Justice Wright,
writing for the majority, relied on Kennedy while Justice Resnick, in dissent,
relied on Ward.81 It is important to realize that both the Casalicchio majority
and its dissent logically applied the tests upon which they relied. The problem,
which Casalicchio evidences, is to determine what constitutes a proper test. To
make this determination, it is beneficial first to analyze each test in the context
of Casalicchio.
VI. APPLYING THE TESTS
A. Kennedy v. Mendozo-Martinez
Applying the Kennedy test, the majority in Casalicchio correctly
determined that Ohio Revised Code Section 2933.43 entails a criminal
forfeiture rather than a civil forfeiture. Although Justice Wright, speaking for
the majority, failed to apply the first prong of the Kennedy test-determining
congressional intent-Justice Resnick's dissenting arguments that a civil statute
was intended are compelling.82 As Justice Resnick notes, Ohio Revised Code
Section 2933.43 provides that:
Where possible, a court holding a forfeiture hearing under this section shall
follow the Rules of Civil Procedure. When a hearing is conducted under this
section, property shall be forfeited upon a showing, by a preponderance of the
required. In addressing the separate question whether punishment is being imposed, the
Court has not employed the tests articulated in [these cases. Therefore,] we need not
address [their] application ....
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 n.6 (1993) (citations omitted). This
statement, at its least, displays that there is no definitive test to apply in determining whether
a statute is civil or criminal. The fact that Austin concerned the application of a
constitutional clause (Excessive Fines) to a forfeiture statute, and that Casalicchio similarly
concerned the application of a constitutional clause (Double Jeopardy) to a forfeiture statute,
raises the question of whether the Casalicchio court focused, at least in part, on the wrong
issue. That is, the Casalicchio court focused primarily on whether the Ohio forfeiture statute
is civil or criminal when, possibly, it should have been more concerned with whether the
statute is remedial or punitive. Although these issues are related, the U.S. Supreme Court's
statement above points out that they are, apparently, not fully inclusive.
81 State v. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d 916, 920-21, 923-24 (Ohio 1991).
82 Although Justice Resnick wrote a dissenting opinion relying on Ward, her analysis is
appropriate here for the Kennedy test (applied by the majority) as the Ward test employs the
same first step as Kennedy. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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evidence, by the petitioner that the person from which the property was seized
was in violation of division (A) .... 83
Indeed the statute's reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure and use of a
preponderance of the evidence standard indicate an intent to enact a civil
provision.84 Furthermore, it is possible to argue, as Justice Resnick does, that
Ohio Revised Code Section 2933.43(D) implies a remedial, and therefore civil,
nature of the statutory scheme in that the legislature is merely trying to recover
costs of enforcing, investigating, and prosecuting Ohio's drug laws.8 5 As a
result, the first part of the test does not pose much of a problem; it appears that
the Ohio legislature did intend the drug forfeiture provision to be a civil statute.
The second prong of the Kennedy test requires a balancing of the
previously mentioned seven factors to determine if the court should overrule
the legislature's intent. 86 The first question is whether the statute creates an
affirmative disability. At least two affirmative disabilities are imposed in
forfeiture cases. First, forfeitures entail imposing an inability to claim title to
the seized property. Second, forfeitures cause the loss of property rights. 87
Thus, there is an affirmative disability involved in the forfeiture statute-a
factor that indicates the criminal nature of the statute.
The second factor is whether the sanction has historically been considered
criminal. This question is troublesome as forfeitures have generally been
considered civil actions in Ohio88 while at the same time there is much debate
about whether drug forfeiture laws should be considered criminal. As explained
83 OHIo RLv. CODE ANN. § 2933.43(C) (Anderson 1993) (emphasis added).
84 Casaicchio, 569 N.E.2d at 923.
85 Id at 923-24. This point is debatable. Simply because there is a spin-off benefit of
increased revenue does not necessarily imply that raising capital to fight the war on drugs is
the statute's aim. Given the defendant's loss of property, it is every bit as reasonable to
assume a punitive effect was the true intention of the legislature, however so disguised.
86 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. The majority did not explain its
analysis of this process in the point by point manner set forth infra. Rather, the majority
simply pointed to two criminally natured aspects of the statute-the statute's protection for
innocent lien holders and its requirement of a felony conviction prior to forfeiture-to
determine that the Kennedy rationale mandates overriding the legislature's apparent intent to
create a civil statute. As a result, it is helpful to apply the criteria point by point.
Casaliccdo, 569 N.E.2d at 921.
87 See Schecter, supra note 16, at 1161. The author points out that an affirmative
disability could be "the mere prohibition of a specific legal act" or "the imposition of an
economic, social, or physical harm" and further that the cases cited in Kennedy involved a
specific legal act. Id. at 1161, 1161 n.71.
88 Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d at 920.
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previously, however, legal views change over time and, as a result, this factor
appears to warrant little consideration.
The third inquiry is whether the statute comes into play on a finding of
scienter. Ohio Revised Code Section 2933.43(C) provides circumstances that
allow one to avoid forfeiture upon a proper showing of lack of knowledge that
the property was involved in a crime or an administrative violation. 89
Consequently, although scienter is not required for the execution of the statute,
a lack of knowledge can exempt an innocent defendant from forfeiture. This, in
turn, points to the criminal nature of the statute.
The fourth point asks whether the law promotes retribution or deterrence.
It is difficult to argue that forcing a defendant to forfeit valuable property does
not promote these objectives. Clearly the threat of losing a home, boat, car, or
other item of value will have a deterrent effect and promote retribution. As
such, the criminal nature of the statute is readily seen in light of the fourth
factor.
The fifth factor asks whether the behavior to which the statute applies is
already a crime. If so, the criminal nature is further exemplified. This, too, is
apparent in the Ohio statute as it requires a felony conviction before there can
be a forfeiture action for a defendant's property. 90 The majority in Casalicchio
correctly found that the requirement of a felony conviction weighs heavily
toward the criminal nature of the statute. 91
The sixth factor is the first and only point that might strongly suggest a
civil statutory scheme for the Ohio laws under the Kennedy analysis. This
factor concerns whether an alternative (remedial) purpose exists for which the
statute may reasonably have been intended. As previously noted, it is possible
that Ohio's forfeiture provision is designed to recover costs incurred in
enforcing the state's drug laws.92 Furthermore, one might argue that forfeiture
helps strip violators of property used to further drug crimes. Both of these
considerations point to a civil nature in the statute.
The seventh factor, however, limits the sixth factor's impact on the
determination. The seventh point asks whether the forfeiture appears excessive
in relation to the alternative (remedial) purpose assigned. Under the Ohio
statute, forfeiture of one's car worth $7000 might be had for driving with
marijuana cigarettes in the car glove compartment. The same offense could also
bring forfeiture of a $700,000 airplane if the marijuana is transported by air
rather than by land. The second scenario exemplifies the possibility of
excessive forfeitures relative to other violations. That is, the statute appears not
89 O-IO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.43(C) (Anderson 1993).
90 Id.
91 Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d at 921.92 1d. at 924.
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to be excessive in the first instance, but appears in the second instance to be
quite excessive, at least in relative terms. As such, the seventh factor can lead
to a determination that the statute is criminal in nature.
The Kennedy test requires one to weigh these factors to determine whether
or not to override congressional intent. As previously stated, 93 the test does not
give an overwhelming amount of deference to Congress. In this instance, the
analysis points away from determining that the Ohio statute has a civil nature as
only the sixth factor clearly indicates a civil purpose for the statute.
Furthermore, the fourth and fifth factors weigh heavily toward the criminal
nature of the statute. On balance, by applying the Kennedy test, the Casalicchio
majority logically determined to override congressional intent to hold that
forfeiture pursuant to Ohio's drug forfeiture provision constitutes a criminal
sanction. 94
B. United States v. Ward
Application of the first prong of the Ward test is the same as that discussed
in the Kennedy analysis. 95 However, the second step in Ward is much more
deferential to legislative intent than is the second step of Kennedy.96 The Ward
test demands the "clearest proof" that the statute is "so punitive" in order to
negate Congress' intent. From the outset, this standard presents a steep, uphill
climb to rebutting legislative intent.
Although the Ohio drug forfeiture statute promotes retribution, serves a
deterrent purpose, requires a conviction of a criminal offense, creates an
affirmative disability, and involves other criminally natured aspects, 97 it does
not appear in Casalicchio's case that these points add up to the "clearest proof
of a punitive nature" required by Ward to negate the civil intent of Ohio's
legislature.98 Given the possible nonpunitive purposes of the statute, one could
93 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
94 Although the Casalicchio Court found the Ohio statute to be of a criminal nature,
this is not the primary consideration here. Rather, the main point is that if one applies the
Kennedy test to the Ohio forfeiture provision, finding the statute to be criminal in nature will
logically follow.
95 See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 86-92.
98 But cf. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). In Austin, the Court,
while expressly not deciding whether the federal drug forfeiture statute (21 U.S.C.
§ 881) is civil or criminal, nonetheless determined that it is in fact punitive in nature.
Id. at 2810-11. An important difference in the cases, however, is that Austin did not
involve the high standard of "clearest proof," required by Ward.
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argue that the forfeiture in Casalicchio's case was not overly punitive.
Casalicchio was in fact concealing in his automobile three different forms of
controlled substances as well as a drug inhaling device. Furthermore, it can be
argued that the value of Casalicchio's car is not so disproportionate to the
crimes committed such that the statute is necessarily criminal as applied. In her
dissent, Justice Resnick further points out that even though the statute requires
a felony conviction prior to forfeiture and that it protects innocent lien holders
and property owners from loss, that in so providing, the legislature sought to
avoid due process problems. 99 These arguments may or may not be
individually persuasive. The point to be taken, however, is that given their
totality and the deference to be accorded Congress under the test, the "clearest
proof" standard that the statute is "so punitive" is simply not met. Thus, by
applying the test provided in Ward, Justice Resnick correctly determined the
statute should be considered civil as applied to Casalicchio.100
It seems clear from the opposite outcomes of the two tests that different
results can occur depending on which test is used. It is therefore worthwhile to
determine which test, if either, is appropriate and should be applied.
VII. DETERMINING A PROPER TEST
Both the Ward and Kennedy tests have the same initial step of inquiring
into legislative intent. The tests differ in their second steps. The Ward test
requires a determination based on the individuality of the case. It will only
determine the statute to be criminal if, in its application, the "clearest proof"
proves it is "so punitive" as to negate congressional intent.' 01 It therefore must
be applied on a case by case analysis, determining the severity of the sanction
based on the value of the forfeited property in comparison to the violation of
the law.102 The Kennedy test, on the other hand, does not require a case by
case analysis to determine if "as applied" the statute is criminal. Rather, it calls
for courts to weigh a number of factors to determine whether the statute is
criminal despite its civil label.' 03 Thus, Kennedy offers a bright-line test to
99 State v. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d 916, 924 (Ohio 1991) (Resnick, J., dissenting).
100 Again, the main point here is not that Justice Resnick's final determination that the
Ohio forfeiture law entails a civil sanction is correct; rather, the primary goal is to illustrate
that applying the Ward test logically leads to the determination that the Ohio statute is civil
in nature.
101 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
102 Schecter, supra note 16, at 1163.
103 Id.
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determine the nature of the statute for every case that is to fall under the
statute.1o4
The reality, however, is that legal issues are not always formfitting to
bright-line tests. Although such tests help shape neat legal symmetry, they can
often lead to unjust consequences. The legislature's desire to fight our
country's drug problem is compelling. Forfeiture laws help lead the battle
against drugs in America. There may be times when, as applied, the overriding
result of Ohio's drug forfeiture statute will be criminal in nature. This being
true, however, it does not follow that Ohio's civilly intended drug forfeiture
statute should therefore always be considered to entail a criminal sanction. 10 5
Although the Kennedy bright-line test is inappropriate, the Ward test itself
should be altered if it is to be effective. Specifically, courts should give less
deference to the legislature in determining whether to override legislative intent
to enact a civil statute. The "clearest proof" that a statute is "so punitive" is
simply too high a level of deference, particularly when constitutional rights
hang in the balance. A number of commentators agree, one stating that:
Courts have previously tried to ascertain the intent of Congress, considering
Congressional intent to be the principal criterion for determining whether a
particular penalty is civil or criminal. But this deference to Congress is a bit
strange . . . [as] "whether a particular penalty is civil or criminal in nature
seems a question of legal philosophy that the Supreme Court is best equipped
to address .... [Ilt is odd, therefore, that the court would defer so heavily to
Congress's classification of forfeiture as civil rather than criminal. 106
This statement is persuasive. Legislatures and prosecutors should not be able to
side step a defendant's constitutional rights by the mere labeling of a statute as
civil.
104Id.
105 Surely it is a legitimate notion to argue that the Ohio legislature desires to rid the
State of items such as super-powered boats capable of maneuvering through six inches of
water and vehicles designed with floorboards and the like that aid in trafficking illegal
drugs. Although these may be extreme examples, is it not a legitimate process for Congress
to enact a civil statute so as to conduct in rem proceedings against such property? If it is
legitimate, as I argue, the problem then is to address how to stop the application of such
statutes from becoming criminal in nature as applied. But see Austin v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2801, 2811 (1993). Aua'dn stated, without elaboration, that real estate and an
automobile involved in drug dealings do not qualify as "instruments" of the drug trade. ld.
It appears difficult to make the same argument in the examples set forth above.
106 Christine Meyer, Zero Tolerance for Forfeiture: A Call for Reform of Cvil
Forfeiture Law, 5 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHncs & PuB. POL'Y 853, 871-72 (1991).
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The problem that arises is that although the Ohio drug forfeiture statute
does have remedial, nonpunitive aspirations, as the statute is applied, its
overriding result has the potential to be punitive in nature. As such, too much
deference to legislative intent can serve to strip a defendant of many of his
constitutional and other rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Determining whether a drug forfeiture statute is civil or criminal should
depend on the facts of each case. In this regard, congressional intent should
serve simply as a starting point in the process. When a forfeiture statute is
applied such that the overriding result is punitive in nature, a defendant's
constitutional rights should not be sacrificed by the mere gloss of a civil label.
This is true even though the legislature may have intended the statute to be
applied in a different manner.
Sean G. Alexander
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